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REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS*
CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE COMMITTEE ON

CONSUMER FINANCIAL SERVICES

The Committee on Consumer Financial Services is an ABA
Committee concerned with the regulation of consumer credit and
the providing of financial services to consumers. In the past several
years, it has become evident that issues relating to consumer bankruptcy are playing an increasingly important role in the structuring
of consumer credit transactions. Because of the importance of
these issues, members of the Committee on Consumer Financial
Services wished to have a forum within their committee, which
would serve as a focal point for dissemination of information, discussion and the formulation of policy alternatives concerning consumer bankruptcy. For these reasons, early in 1980 the Committee
on Consumer Financial Services established a Subcommittee on
Consumer Bankruptcy to consider consumer bankruptcy issues,
and, more particularly, to consider the relationship between consumer bankruptcy issues and consumer credit transactions.
The Section has a Committee on Consumer Bankruptcy,
which has also considered some of the same issues as those reported on below. The Subcommittee has attempted to maintain a
close liaison with said Committee, to ensure that each group was
fully apprised of what the other was doing and a full airing of all
issues. In addition, several other Section committees have expressed an interest in the subject (Banking, Consumer Affairs,
Credit Unions, Mutual Savings Banks and Savings and Loan Associations). The chairman of each of those committees had forwarded to him an initial and final draft of the report and had the
views of his committee solicited.
The new Bankruptcy Code became effective on October 1,
1979. Immediately thereafter, the number of bankruptcy cases began to increase dramatically, and creditors found that their bankruptcy losses were increasing, often by multiples of two, three, or
* This Report and Recommendation was prepared by the Consumer
Bankruptcy Subcommittee of the Committee on Consumer Financial Services of
the American Bar Association Section on Corporation, Banking and Business
Law. The Northern Illinois University Law Review thanks Jonathan M. Landers,
chief draftsman on the project, for his assistance in obtaining this Report for
publication.

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

four of what they had been before the Code became effective. At
the time this Subcommittee was organized, there already were various proposals to amend the Bankruptcy Code, and such proposals were receiving considerable congressionable attention. Such attention was itself significant because Congress usually is reluctant
to examine legislation such as the Code, which is extremely technical and which was preceded by a lengthy period of study and debate, so soon after enactment.
The Subcommittee determined that its first task was to bring
its expertise to bear on the possible need for changes in the Bankruptcy Code. To this end, the Subcommittee met in San Francisco
in May of 1981, and decided to continue to monitor developments
but not to make specific recommendations until more experience
under the Code could be accumulated. Thereafter, the Subcommittee met in Washington in April, 1982, and as a result of that meeting, a summary report of recommendations was prepared. That
summary was circulated to the full Committee at its meeting in
Chicago in April, 1982. During the Committee's meeting, the
Chairman of the Bankruptcy Subcommittee reported on the Subcommittee's deliberations and general recommendations, and his
report was discussed by the full Committee. Thereafter, a draft report was prepared, which was considered by the Subcommittee at
its meeting on July 7, 1982. The present report represents the final
recommendation of our Subcommittee.
The membership of the Subcommittee is comprised of persons
who are actively concerned with consumer bankruptcy issues. In
connection with our consideration of the issues, the Chairman distributed copies of various legislative proposals, as well as a Report
of the Senate Banking Committee, which has been considering
bankruptcy legislation. In addition, the Chairman has distributed
minutes of meetings held by the Section's Consumer Bankruptcy
Committee, which Committee has been considering some of the
same issues.
Our report is divided into two sections. The first generally
analyzes the Bankruptcy Code and its premises in the light of the
structure of the consumer credit industry. The second discusses
specific recommendations of this Subcommittee. In connection
with the specific recommendations, we would note that the recommendations address general issues of consumer bankruptcy policy,
but do not focus upon the specific details of implementing legislation. Moreover, although the recommendations address many of
the areas that are covered by various items of pending legislation,

[1982:239]

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS

the Subcommittee did not believe that it should make a detailed
evaluation of the specific language of particular proposals.
THE IMPACT OF THE BANKRUPTCY CODE ON CONSUMER CREDIT

There are three dominant themes of the Bankruptcy Code
which have a significant bearing on the bankruptcy experience of
members of the consumer credit industry. These are discussed in
the first three subparts. The effect of these themes is discussed in
the fourth.
Reliance on Assets to Pay Debts
THE BASIS FOR EXTENDING CONSUMER CREDIT -

FUTURE INCOME

The basic assumption of the consumer credit industry is that
consumers will pay debts out of future income rather than from
the liquidation of existing assets. In fact, a typical consumer often
could not pay ordinary consumer debts if his property were sold
immediately after a credit transaction and the proceeds distributed
to creditors. With two exceptions, the resale price of most consumer:owned property, such as furniture and household goods,
clothing, tools of the trade, and the like, is well below its replacement value. This is understandable. Consumer goods are not purchased for resale, and are not cared for in a way that would make
them readily saleable.
The two typical exceptions are the consumer's home and car.
In practice, these assets are not often available to general creditors
for repayment of debts. Typically, the consumer's home will be
subject to several mortgages, and any equity will be exempt under
homestead or other exemption laws. And similarly, the consumer's
car will be subject to liens in excess of its value. Even if there is
some equity in the car, the amount probably will be exempt or too
small to justify the transaction costs creditors must incur to reach
it.
Consumer creditors thus must rely on future income as a
source for repayment of debt. That they do is evidenced by modern loan applications which invariably seek information on the
consumer's income and the likelihood it will continue and seldom
obtain much information on his assets (except to the extent it
bears on the likelihood the debtor's income will continue). Also,
the information creditors do obtain simply does not approach the
accuracy of business financial statements as to either income or
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debts.1 In essence, creditors rely on the debtor's promise to use
future income to pay consumer debts. Put another way, the risk
that consumer creditors take is that the debtor's future income will
be inadequate to pay his debts.
BANKRUPTCY AS ASSETS-BASED RELIEF

The Bankruptcy Code adopts a diametrically opposite approach. Any person may obtain relief without precondition; the
debtor must surrender his nonexempt property (which is liquidated and the proceeds distributed to creditors), and receives a
discharge from his debts. The Code thus adopts a wholly assetsbased approach to bankruptcy which ignores any consideration of
future income-the very asset which was the basis of the extension
of credit. The Bankruptcy Code thus stands the fundamental assuption of consumer credit on its head.
The purpose of bankruptcy relief is to enable the honest but
unfortunate debtor to obtain relief from the financial pressures
which result from excessive debt.' Excessive debt is, in the final
analysis, a serious social problem which can result in a number of
interrelated personal, economic, and family problems. It is in the
public interest to discharge debts which the debtor cannot reasonably expect to pay. As the "price" for such a discharge, the debtor
is required to surrender his property, although in reality, few debtors have any significant amount of property which must be surrendered. Indeed, in ninety percent or more of consumer cases, there
are no assets available for distribution to creditors. The absence of
assets is, of course, entirely consistent with the fact that creditors
expect debts to be repaid out of future income and not a liquidation of present assets.
1. The Bankruptcy Code recognizes the minimal reliability of consumer
financial statements by imposing rigorous requirements on creditors who seek to
have a debt held nondischargeable because of a false financial statement. 11
U.S.C. § 523(a)(2), (b) (1978).
2. The present concept of discharge is a comparatively recent development.
Under the early English bankruptcy legislation, the purpose of the discharge was
not to relieve the debtor from oppressive debt. Rather, it was a "reward" for cooperating with bankruptcy officials in locating and selling the debtor's property.
Historically, then, the discharge was a form of creditor protection. See Kennedy,
Reflections on the Bankruptcy Laws of the United States: The Debtor's Fresh
Start, 76 W. VA. L. REv. 427 (1974). Under early bankruptcy laws in this country,
a discharge was not granted unless the debtor paid a percentage of his debts, or a
percentage of creditors consented.
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There are, undoubtedly, many debtors who have no reasonable
prospect of being able to pay even a portion of their present debts
out of future income. The first consideration in such cases must be
the debtor's continuing obligation to provide adequate support for
himself and his family. In some cases, the debtor's income will be
barely adequate to provide such support, and in others, the debtor
will have so many debts in relation to his income level and needs,
that there is no realistic prospect of anything more than a nominal
payment to creditors. Some debtors will have suffered such serious
financial reverses from illness, substantial income reductions (layoff, lost job, lost overtime), or family difficulties, that any possibility of payment is ephemeral. For these debtors, an assets-based approach to discharge makes good common sense because there
simply is no reasonable alternative.
The Code thus begins with the proposition that some debtors
cannot reasonably be expected to pay their debts and that assetsbased relief is the only practical alternative, but then applies that
approach rigidly and across the board to all debtors. There seem to
be several reasons for this approach. First, the substantial research
indicating that bankruptcy frequently resulted from unforeseeable
causes was equated with the view that debts could not be paid out
of future income. Second, it was thought that there were so many
disincentives to file bankruptcy that only persons leading "lives of
desperation" would file; by definition, such persons could not be
expected to pay debts in the future. Third, there was no empirical
basis for believing that debtors could pay their debts out of future
income. A closer look at these is in order.
Causes of Bankruptcy. There has been considerable attention paid to the underlying causes of bankruptcy. The research
showed that the underlying causes often were "unforeseeable."
Among the common causes were illness, substantial losses of income (loss of job, layoff, strike, or lost overtime by debtor and/or
spouse) and family difficulties (separation or divorce).3 To these
factors may be added a new one the cumulative effect of inflation,
and the difficulty of catching up once a consumer falls behind.
There is a certain sense that if a consumer becomes bankrupt
because of unforeseen factors, he will not be able to pay his debts
3. See, e.g., 1 REPORT

OF THE COMMISSION ON THE BANRUPTCY LAWS OF THE

H.R. Doc. No. 137, 93rd Cong., lst Seas., Pts. I & II, 45-55 (1973)
[hereinafter cited as BANKRUPTCY COMM'N REP.]; D. STANLEY & M. GIRTH, BANKRUPTCY: PROBLEM, PROCESS, REFORM 47 (1971) [hereinafter STANLEY & GIRTH].
UNITED STATES,

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

out of future income. But, there is no necessary cause and effect
relationship. For example, the heavy medical expenses may have
terminated; the consumer may have regained this former income
level; or the family problem may have been resolved. While inflation may make it impossible for the debtor to pay all of his prepetition debts, the very concept of inflation as a cause suggests
that the debtor can pay a portion of them.
Moreover, this emphasis on unforeseeable causes tends to
overlook entirely the fact that the underlying cause of many bankruptcies is poor debt management. The well-known Brookings
Study found this to be the leading underlying cause of bankruptcy.4 Such persons do need some relief, but they undoubtedly
can pay a portion of their debts out of future income.
Disincentives to Bankruptcy. The old Act furnished some
basis for the rather widespread view that persons would not file
bankruptcy petitions unless their situation was so desperate that
they were literally "forced to the wall." According to this reasoning, bankruptcy offered few benefits and many detriments. Persons only filed if their need for relief was so great that it overcame
these disincentives. By definition, such persons had low income
and no assets, and could not be expected to pay any substantial
portion of their debts in the future.
What were these disincentives? First was the cost of filing a
bankruptcy petition itself, including filing fees and the cost of an
attorney.' Second, the debtor would lose all his nonexempt property, and exemptions were determined by state law. Many states
had minimal exemptions, and others readily permitted waivers of
exemptions. Third, if the debtor owned consumer goods that were
subject to security interests, such as a car or furniture, he might
have to pay the full amount of the debt to retain the items even if
their value was considerably less than the amount of the debt. The
practical result often was that the underlying debts had to be paid
in full. Fourth, there were restrictions on discharge aid, more importantly, on which debts were discharged. These included alimony and support claims, most taxes, debts procured by fraud,
4. See STANLEY & GIRTH, supra note 3, at 47 (31%).
5. Under the old Act, there was a $50 filing fee for each debtor. See 11
U.S.C. §§ 68(c)(1), 76(c), 80(a) (1976) (repealed 1978). The Supreme Court
seemed to recognize that some persons were too poor to go bankrupt. See United
States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434 (1973). The Bankruptcy Commission reported attor-

ney's fees frequently in the $300-$500 range. 1
note 3, at 47.

BANKRUPTCY COMM'N REP.,

supra
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conversion claims (sometimes, these included simply selling consumer goods that were subject to a security interest),6 judgments
arising from willful torts, many of which were really more like
gross negligence.7 Fifth, there were fewer restrictions on post-petition efforts to collect discharged debts, especially secured debts.
Sixth, there were few limitations on post-petition discrimination
against former bankrupts, especially when practiced by non-governmental parties.' Seventh, there was the stigma of bankruptcy.
While there has, of course, been considerable research on the question of how many debtors felt how much stigma, it is clear that
many debtors did think there was such a stigma.9 And, such a
stigma might be reinforced by the property deprivation provisions
and minimal level of exemptions noted above.
Ability to Pay Debts Out of Future Income. The assumption that most debtors would not be able to pay debts out of future
income is implicit in the assets-based approach to bankruptcy relief. However, it is fair to say that prior to the adoption of the
Code there was no systematic attempt to determine whether or not
this was true.
This evidence now is available. Professor Robert Johnson's
comprehensive study establishes beyond cavil that, by any measure, a considerable number of debtors have substantial debt-paying ability. 10 Regardless of the academic barbs which can be
thrown at this or, for that matter, any similar kind of empirical
study, the Johnson Study does reveal that a substantial number of
debtors could pay all or most of their debts over a period of three
to five years. Although the Subcommittee is aware of much anecdotal evidence which suggests that many debtors are poor, it is not
aware of any other systematic attempt to assemble hard data on
the subject.
Moreover, Professor Johnson's results have at least some confirmation in practices which were widespread under the old Act.
6. See, e.g., Bennett v. W.T. Grant Co., 481 F.2d 664 (4th Cir. 1973).
7. See, e.g., In re Keenan, 3 BANKR. CT. DEC. (CRR) 697 (Bankr. N.D. Ga.

1977) (drunk driving). Prior to 1970, the question of dischargeability of disputed
debts was almost always determined in the state courts. In practice, this meant

more debts were held nondischargeable. See Rendleman, The Bankruptcy Discharge: Toward a FresherStart, 58 N.C.L. REV. 723, 727-32 (1980).
8. See, e.g., Girardier v. Webster College, 563 F.2d 1267 (8th Cir. 1977) (pri-

vate college not required to provide transcript to discharged debtor).
9. See, e.g., STANLEY & GIRTH, supra note 3, at 65-69.
10. R.

JOHNSON, CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY STUDY (1982).
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Thus, we have already noted that there were a number of disincentives to file under the old Act. In reality, the disincentives often
created post-discharge problems for the debtor who often found it
necessary to use future (post-petition) income to resolve the particular problem. For example, the debtor who faced the loss of personal property to secured creditors frequently had to use future
income to pay the debts in full and avoid repossession. Alternatively, if the property was surrendered to a secured creditor or the
trustee, the debtor might have to use future income to buy replacements. To the extent that debts were nondischargeable, the debtor
had to use future income to pay them. The debtor even had to use
future income to establich that pre-petition debts were dischargeable or that property was exempt."1 The debtor often had to use
future income to pay creditors whose debts had been discharged,
but who still had leverage against the debtor or could exercise
some form of moral suasion-claims of friends, relatives, employers, private colleges, medical providers, persons who might resort
to criminal prosecutions, licensing authorities, landlords, and
others come readily to mind. Finally, the frequent reaffirmations of
debt-to retain property subject to security interests, to obtain future credit, and simply, to "clear the record"-required the debtor
to pledge future income to pay debts. Whether one calls this a
fresh start or not is somewhat beside the point. The key fact is
that debtors often found it necessary to use future income to relieve post-discharge problems relating to pre-petition debts. This,
in turn, strongly suggests that a number of debtors did in fact have
income available to pay at least a portion of their debts, and that
the effect of bankruptcy laws was to require the debtor to use future income for that purpose.
To summarize, consumer credit is essentially an income-based
system for granting credit, but bankruptcy is an assets-based system for relieving a debtor of credit obligations.
The Diminished Value of Security
It is somewhat ironic that at the same time that the Code continued to employ an assets-based approach to bankruptcy, a num11. Until recently, it was generally held that attorney's fees for defending
dischargeability claims was not a proper administrative expense. See, e.g., In re

Rothman, 85 F.2d 51 (2d Cir. 1936). This view was even stronger as to exemption
claims. See In re Eastwood, 239 F. Supp. 847 (D. Or. 1965). In any event, there
usually was not enough money in the estate to pay such claims.
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ber of Code provisions directly impaired the value of security interests held by consumer creditors. The Code accomplished this in
two different ways. First, several Code provisions effectively reduced the value of collateral to the creditor. This will be discussed
below. Second, other provisions tended to increase the costs of enforcing a security interest, thereby diminishing the value of the security interest. This problem will be discussed in the next section.
Most consumer security falls into one of three categories home, vehicles or household goods. The Code has significantly diminished the value of automobile security, and all but eliminated
any economic incentive to obtain security in household goods.
The value of automobile security has been diminished in several material respects. First, creditors do not have immediate access to the vehicle upon the filing of a bankruptcy petition. Instead, there usually is a hiatus of several months or longer during
which the debtor continues to use the car, and during which the
car continues to depreciate and may be damaged or transferred.
Second, consumers can redeem the car by paying its value,12 or can
repay the value in installments in a chapter 13 plan." Many courts
interpret value as wholesale value, or somewhat between wholesale
and retail value. The effect of the bankruptcy provisions thus has
been to lower the value of the security to substantially less than
the amount of the debt. To compound the problem, some courts
have permitted the debtor to repay the determined value in installments with interest at a substantially lower rate than the contract or market rate. In sum, the creditor who thinks it is fully
secured by the debtor's car may find that bankruptcy has caused a
substantial portion of the debt to become unsecured.
Security interests in household furnishings and appliances, are
of little economic value in bankruptcy. First, such items are subject to the same valuation standard as cars, but because there is no
established resale market, determined values tend to be extremely
low in relation to debt. Moreover, such items suffer a precipitous
decline immediately upon purchase, thus causing rapid erosion of
the security."' Second, if such items are exempt under state or federal law-as is often the case-nonpurchase-money security inter12. 11 U.S.C. § 722.

13. Id. § 1325(a)(5).
14. See In re Damron, 8 Bankr. 323 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1981)(furniture and
applicance lost almost 60% of value in 10 months even though still in "like new"
condition).
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ests are invalidated.18
Even home mortgage security has been diminished in value.
The automatic stay prevents immediate foreclosure even if the
debtor missed payments for several months or longer. Courts frequently permit the debtor to cure defaults over an extended period
of time and, again, at below market interest rates." If the value of
the home does not exceed the debt by a substantial margin, delays
in obtaining relief from the stay may further erode the collateral.
Then, too, creditors must incur the costs and expense of stay litigation. Even if the creditor ultimately succeeds, it then may suffer
further delays because of the need to comply with state law eviction proceedings that were stayed in bankruptcy. Finally, if the
mortgagee has been unfortunate enough to take personal property
security as well as real estate, the secured creditor's contract can
be modified in chapter 13.
The net result is that the only security that now has real economic value is a home in which the debtor has meaningful equity.
Thus, creditors who want security find that they must take second
mortgages on homes in lieu of other security which the Code has
rendered valueless. This trend is most unfortunate. For many
years, both state and federal legislation have sought to protect the
consumer's home above other assets from creditors. Yet the present Code practically forces creditors to obtain such security or to
lend on an unsecured basis. While the present provisions undoubtedly were well motivated, it is doubtful that this result was
intended.
The Transaction Cost Problem
It is no secret that legal proceedings are expensive. Parties
must measure any substantive rights they have against the costs of
enforcement. A party weighing action to enforce a substantive
right must consider the maximum benefit which may be obtained,
the chances of obtaining that benefit, the costs of obtaining that
benefit (both direct and indirect), and any other exposure the ac15. 11 U.S.C. § 522(f)(2). Recent decisions have further diminished the value
of security by holding that various cross-collateral or refinancing transactions
may convert purchase-money transactions into nonpurchase-money transactions
which may be awarded under Section 522(f). See In re Haus, 18 Bankr. 413
(Bankr. D.S.C. 1982); In re Jebbia, 9 Bankr. 542 (Bankr. S.D. Ala. 1980).
16. See In re Mart, 7 BANKR. CT. DEC. (CRR) 1066 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1981)
(legal rate).
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tion entails. Litigation makes economic sense only if the equation
yields a positive figure. Thus, it is not enough to give creditors various rights if it costs so much to enforce rights that they lose any
economic value. Unfortunately, there are a number of Code provisions which purport to give creditors rights which cannot be economically enforced.
In theory, a secured creditor should have immediate access to
security to satisfy its debts. Indeed, recognition of the importance
of simplified default procedures was one of the fundamental premises of the Uniform Commercial Code provisions dealing with default the repossession.' Under the Bankruptcy Code, however, the
secured creditor whose security interest is not in any way disputed
or contested must go through a series of time consuming and expensive steps to reclaim its security. These steps significantly
erode the value of security.
When the debtor files his petition, he ordinarily has possession
of secured property. Surprisingly, however, the Code makes no
provision for the ultimate disposition of secured property.1 8 Thus,
there is no requirement that the debtor either surrender the property to the secured creditor, or even tell the trustee or the secured
creditor what he intends to do with it. At the same time, secured
creditors are forbidden to communicate with the debtor, and often
find it difficult or impossible to get information from the debtor's
attorney.
In this context, the only remedy available to the secured creditor is to seek relief from the automatic stay.' 9 To do so, the creditor must file a complaint, and participate in one, or more often
two, court hearings. Alternatively, the debtor may choose to reaffirm the debt, but again, there are substantial transaction costs involved in securing reaffirmation. The net result is that the value of
security at the time of the petition is diminished by the costs of
reclaiming the property or obtaining payment of the debt.
In chapter 13 proceedings, the debtor usually proposes to retain the items subject to a security interest and to pay their value
in a series of installments. The debtor's plan itself will value the
security, and that value will be final unless the creditor shoulders
the expense of contesting the valuation. In practice, the costs of
17.
18.
secured
19.

See U.C.C. §§ 9-501 to -507.
Arguably, 11 U.S.C. § 725 requires the property to be delivered to the
creditor, but this has not in fact occurred.
See id. § 362(d).
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contesting valuation deter any contest unless the actual difference
between the proposed value and the secured creditor's opinion of
value is sufficiently different to warrant the expense and risk of
litigation - that is, at least $500 to $1000. However, for much consumer collateral, differences in valuation simply are not that great,
and in practice, creditors cannot contest value. Similar cost factors
deter litigation on the interest rate the debtor proposes to pay on
secured claims. For example, if the secured claim is $3000, the
debtor proposes an interest rate of twelve precent and the creditor
thinks it should be eighteen percent, the dollar difference (over
three years) is only about $300. Litigation over this amount is economically impossible.
The same kind of problem exists in connection with creditor
attempts to contest a chapter 13 plan. Suppose, for example, the
debtor proposes a chapter 13 plan that will devote $200 per month
to the plan, and will result in a ten percent payment to creditor X.
X believes that this is too low, and that the debtor could in fact
devote $400 per month to the plan, which would result in a payment of twenty-five percent of unsecured claims. However, even if
X's claim is $3000 (a very high amount for an unsecured claim in a
consumer case), the dollar difference is only $450 over the life of
the plan, discounted to prevent value. Creditors simply do not
have the economic incentive to object to confirmation under such
circumstances. Indeed, a number of judges have commented on
the absence of creditor objection in confirming marginal plans.
However, the reason is readily apparent-creditors cannot afford
to object.
There are other examples which will be referred to in the
course of the analysis of the specific areas in need of reform. However, we would simply observe that the Code takes a litigation-oriented approach toward resolving bankruptcy matters, even when
there is little or no actual controversy on the underlying issue.
While this may be justifiable in large commercial bankruptcies, the
size of consumer claims simply prices consumer creditors out of
actual participation in the process.
The Code Experience
The Bankruptcy Code permits any debtor to file a chapter 7 or
chapter 13 petition. The debtor need not show an inability to pay
his present debts, nor must he show an inability to pay them out of
future income. While it is undoubtedly true that some debtors cannot pay their debts out of future income, reason and available evi-
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dence suggest that others are able to do so.
It was noted above that under the old Act former bankrupts
frequently had to use future income to resolve post-bankruptcy
problems created by pre-petition debt. Now, many of these carryover problems which tended to deter petitions in the first place
have been removed, so that consumers with greater debt-paying
ability are using the bankruptcy remedy. Morever, the Code provisions effectively minimize the amount of future income necessary
to deal with problems created by pre-petition debts.
For example, the initial costs of bankruptcy have been
brought down by reducing the filing fee for joint petitions and by
the widespread availability of "low cost" bankruptcy lawyers and
"do it yourself" packages.20 The debtor no longer must pay the full
amount of the debt to retain property which is subject to a security
interest. Now, the debtor may redeem consumer goods by paying
their present value, or may pay the present value in installments as
part of a chapter 13 plan. A greatly liberalized exemptive scheme
now permits the retention of signficant amounts of property, and
avoids nonpurchase money liens on much of this property. Subtle
differences in the provisions governing dischargeable debts have
made more debts dischargeable.2 1 There are more restraints on
post-petition efforts to collect debts, and strengthened prohibitions
on various forms of discriminatory conduct. 2"
The cumulative effect of these provisions is to permit the consumer to keep more of his property, and otherwise reduce the costs
of bankruptcy. Moreover, it is no longer necessary for the debtor to
pledge future income to avoid many of the burdens of bankruptcy.
The predictable result is more bankruptcy petitions, and more petitions by persons who could pay a portion of their debts.
.In fact, the increase in the number of petitions has been an
outright explosion:
20. The filing fee for a joint petition is $60. 28 U.S.C. § 1930(a)(1) (1978).
Many lawyers offer bankruptcy services for $150-200.

21. To cite two examples, decisions under the Code have tended to discharge
virtually all tort claims, including drunk driving and conversion of collateral
cases. See In re Hodges, 4 Bankr. 513 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 1980); In re Bryson, 3
Bankr. 593 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1980).
22. 11 U.S.C. §§ 524(a), 525. For example, public colleges no longer may
withhold transcripts; and state officials no longer may penalize former bankrupts
by special licensing requirements.
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Njiber of Bankruptcy Miis Per One Thousand Households.
Total U.S., 1967-1981

National Consumer Finance Association Chart. Source:

Administration Office of the United States Courts. Bureau of the

Census.

There is no doubt that part of this increase results from the
cumulative effects of inflation and recession. But as a complete or
substantial explanation, general economic conditions simply will
not do. Such general economic conditions would predictably lead
to a gradual increase in the number of bankruptcy cases. 8 But,
the figures show no such gradual increase. Instead, they show a
startling increase in the number of bankruptcies in an extremely
short period which coincides precisely with the adoption of the
Code. The chart graphically illustrates this phenomenon. It confounds common sense to suggest that general economic and social
trends are responsible for immediate and dramatic changes of this
nature.
It is recognized that attributing the increase in bankruptcy
filings and losses to economic and social trends has considerable
appeal. At the time the Code was adopted, many thought that its
economic impact would be minimal. According to this view, the
Code simply would eliminate marginal practices of a type which
23. This is, in fact, what happened in the recessionary months before the

Code became effective.
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did not involve significant economic costs. The impact of many of
the present provisions was only perceived dimly, if at all. Then,
too, there was the fact that the Bankruptcy Code had been around
so long that proposals tended to take on a life of their own and
sometimes did not receive a searching economic analysis. Moreover, there was a basic philosophical view that creditors were, in a
sense, extending too much credit. Thus, limiting bankruptcy rights
of creditors seemed to be a good way to restrain the granting of
credit to persons who were not good credit risks. Ironically, the
above attitude was directly contrary to the emphasis of statutes
such as Truth-in-Lending, 24 Equal Credit Opportunity, 26 Fair
Credit Reporting, 6 and Fair Credit Billing,2 7 all of which tended to
make credit more widely available to persons who previously were
considered marginal risks.
Finally, the view that bankruptcy losses are attributable solely
to economic forces operating independently of the Code obviates
the need to make a careful analysis of the Code provisions themselves. For if changing the Code would not significantly reduce
bankruptcy losses, there is little reason to give serious consideration to such change. However, even if economic factors and the
Code both play a role in the increasing bankruptcy losses, then
there may be good reason to consider changes in the Code. Even
though that component of bankruptcy losses caused by economic
conditions cannot be affected by alterations in the Code, the other
portion can. In other words, it is only if increased bankruptcy
losses are attributed solely or largely to economic conditions that it
is possible to insist on the status quo and avoid taking a hard look
at the Code's impact on bankruptcy losses.
There is a tendency to think of bankruptcy losses as "free
lunches"-costs no one bears. Of course, this is not true. But until
recently, there was another version of this view which was more
palatable. This version suggested that while bankruptcy losses
were obviously not "free," they were not significant economic factors. The Brookings Study, for example, estimated total bankruptcy losses in consumer cases as $600,000,000, and intimated
that the economic impact was not deserving of detailed analysis.2 8
Regardless of whether this was ever true, it certainly is not
4. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1667e (1976).
25. Id. § 1691-1691f (1976).

26. Id. § 1681-1681t (1976).
27. Id. § 1666-1666j (1976).
28. STANLEY & GIRTH, supra note 3, at 37-39.
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true now. Recent evidence suggests that losses are conservatively
estimated at $5-6 billion or more. Major consumer creditors are
reporting staggering bankruptcy losses. Often, these losses are two,
three, or four times greater than losses the year before the Code
became effective. In many cases, such losses comprise a substantial
proportion of net profits.
In the long run, losses of these dimensions simply will not be
borne by the firms suffering the losses. In some cases, firms which
cannot shift costs will themselves face bankruptcy. In other cases,
firms may decide to invest capital in more productive areas. The
result may be to lower the amount of credit available to consumers, and often, to exclude the neediest borrowers-who present the
highest risk of bankruptcy-from the credit marketplace.
Quite apart from these consequences, creditors may be expected to adopt credit practices to minimize the impact of bankruptcy. This is, unfortunately, a limited cure. Since consumer
credit is, as has been emphasized, based on future income, there
often is little creditors can do to minimize such losses. Moreover,
the limited measures which are available tend to have an impact
on persons not in bankruptcy.
First, consumers will ultimately have to pay part of the cost of
the bankruptcy losses in the form of higher charges for goods and
services and/or the cost of credit. Bankruptcy losses simply are one
element in an overall pricing structure, and must be figured into
prices together with other costs of doing business. It is no secret
that prices for both goods and credit have increased rapidly in the
past few years. While inflation and the rise in interest rates explain
part of this increase, there is every reason to think that bankruptcy losses have also been partly responsible. Thus, the effect of
bankruptcy is to shift costs from consumers who don't pay their
debts to those who do. This effect is especially significant since the
debtors who will bear the costs must pay them out of future income. The present law thus taxes the future income of debtors
who do not go bankrupt to free the future income of those who do.
Second, if certain transactions produce relatively high bankruptcy losses, such transactions may be eliminated entirely. One
way to avoid bankruptcy losses is to decrease credit to the class of
debtors most likely to become debtors in a bankruptcy proceeding.
Yet those person often are most in need of credit, and the social
costs may be to drive such persons to illegal lenders. A further
effect may be to undermine the financial solvency of firms which
transact business with some of these debtors.
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Third, creditors may use practices designed to minimize the
impact of bankruptcy. For example, they may make secured rather
than unsecured loans, or require second mortgages on homes
rather than personal property as collateral. Creditors may insist on
one or more co-signers, and even collateral posted by co-signers.29
Creditors may move to repayment systems which work automatically, such as regular deductions from wages or bank accounts, or
more frequent payments. Or, they may give preference to debtors
who have assets in the lending institution which assets will be
available for set-off in the event of bankruptcy. All of these practices, and many others which could be cited, are common in impact: They seek to provide greater protection for creditors in the
event of the debtor's bankruptcy. But they also exclude many
credit-worthy consumers from the credit marketplace, and tend to
broaden the fallout from the debtor's financial difficulty. At best,
they are limited solutions because of their limited availability.
To summarize, consumer bankruptcy has become a serious economic problem. The costs upon all consumers are substantial, and
there are threats to a continued stream of consumer credit. There
is a pressing need for prompt remedial action.
THE SPECIFIC PROBLEMS

The basic approach of the Subcommittee has been to identify
problem areas and recommend solutions without trying to undo
the basic structure of the Code. These recommendations strike at
the basic economic issues inherent in assets-based bankruptcy relief, as well as at a number of more specific provisions of the Code.
Persons Who Can Pay a Reasonable Portion of Debts
NATURE OF THE PROBLEM

There are two types of bankruptcy proceedings. In a chapter 7
liquidation, the debtor's non-exempt assets are sold to pay creditors. Most debts are discharged. In a chapter 13 case, the debtor
proposes a plan to pay his debts over a period of time, and usually,
out of future income. Almost all debts which are not paid are discharged. Ordinarily, a chapter 13 debtor keeps his property.
Roughly seventy percent of all loan bankruptcy cases are chapter 7
29. Credit practices which seek to involve co-debtors can have a domino ef-

fect, resulting in bankruptcies of a number of persons who have become involved
in each other's obligations.
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cases, but the proportion varies widely among different districts.
Chapter 7. The Johnson Study 0 shows that a substantial
number of debtors who could pay a substantial portion of their
debts out of future income file chapter 7 petitions. Through broadened exemptions, avoidance of liens on exempt property and redemption, debtors now may emerge from bankruptcy with substantial property of significant value. The automatic stay, postdischarge injunction, and restrictions on discrimination, tend to insulate the debtor from creditors and make bankruptcy a painless
cure for financial maladies. Today's debtors are bombarded with
advertisements emphasizing bankruptcy as a panacea for debt
problems. People are encouraged to invoke bankruptcy relief, and
not surprisingly, many more of them do so.
The consequences have already been reported: a near-doubling
of bankruptcy cases in a short period; mounting bankruptcy losses;
attempts to shift costs to other consumers; restrictions on credit
availability. If debtors are to continue to enjoy the benefits of
bankruptcy and the deterrents to bankruptcy continue to be minimal, then a reexamination of the assets-based concept is essential.
Chapter 13. In theory, these problems should not exist in
chapter 13 because it looks to payment of present debts out of future income. But this expectation has been confounded because of
the absence of a meaningful standard for determining what portion
of the debtor's income should be devoted to the plan, the percentage of unsecured debt that should be paid, and how long the plan
should last.8' The absence of such meaningful standards has had
an important impact on the ability of creditors to obtain meaningful recoveries in chapter 13 cases.
Chapter 13 does not have any standard which specifies how
much of the debtor's future income should be devoted to the plan.
Also, there are no standards set as to what percentages, if any, of
unsecured claims should be paid. The only provisions which even
bear on these issues are section 1325(a)(4), which requires that
creditors receive at least as much in a chapter 13 cases as they
would receive in a chapter 7 liquidation, and section 1325(a)(3),
which requires the plan to be "proposed in good faith."
R. JOHNSON, supra note 10.
31. See Testimony of Prof. V. Countryman before the Subcomm. on Monopolies and Commercial Law of the House Judiciary Comm, 97th Cong., 1st Sess.
12-14, 20-21, 43-44 (Oct. 22, 1981) [hereinafter cited as Countryman]; Cyr, The
30.

Chapter 13 "Good Faith" Tempest: Analysis and Proposals,55 AM. BANKR. L.J.
271 (1981).
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In both theory and practice, the requirement that creditors in
a chapter 13 case receive at least as much as they would receive in
a chapter 7 liquidation is not a significant standard. In theory, the
liquidation standard necessarily looks to present assets as a source
for paying debts. The fact that debts cannot be paid out of assets
has no bearing upon the extent to which they can be paid out of
future income. In practice, chapter 13 creditors usually would receive little or nothing in a chapter 7 case because the debtor has
little or no nonexempt property for distribution. Indeed, some
courts have turned this standard around against creditors, and
used it as the basis for confirming chapter 13 plans providing for
no payments or nominal payments to creditors. These courts reason that since creditors would have received nothing in a Chapter
7 case, they have little cause to complain if they receive nominal
payments under a chapter 13 plan.8'
The "good faith" standard provides little further protection.
The standard is unduly vague, and there is no legislative history or
other provisions of chapter 13 which would help to give it content.
Indeed, it is not even clear whether good faith requires some objectively determined portion of the debtor's future income to be devoted to the plan, or whether subjective goodness (a "pure heart")
is all that is necessary.38 The Code does not even provide that repayment of debt takes precedence over expenses for non-necessary
or luxury items."
Given such vague and uncertain standards, it is not surprising
to find widely different approaches among bankruptcy courts.
Some courts have set a benchmark test of a seventy percent pay32. See In re Stollenwerck, 8 Bankr. 297 (Bankr. M.D. Ala. 1981); In re Cloutier, 3 Bankr. 584 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1980).
33. See In re Stollenwerck (debtor's proposal to pay one-half of excess disposable income is in good faith); In re Sudduth, 9 Bankr. 405, 407 (Bankr. N.D.
Ga. 1981) (allegations that payments are insignificant in light of available disposa.
ble income and are not "material to a determination of ... good faith .
After an exhaustive examination of the meaning of good faith, Judge Norton
concluded that it simply meant "honesty or purpose" and "full and complete disclosure." On the other hand, good faith did not have a quantitative meaning, nor
did it require the debtor's best effort. In re Wiggles, 7 Bankr. 373, 375-80 (Bankr.
N.D. Ga. 1980); accord, In re Burrell, 8 BANKR. CT. Dzc. (CRR) 1127 (Bankr.
N.D. Cal. 1982).
34. See In re Stollenwerck (out of excess disposable income of $400 per
month, plan proposed to pay $200 per month; no payments to unsecured
creditors).
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ment," while others have specifically rejected guidelines. Some
courts reportedly press debtors' attorneys for plans paying fifty to
one hundred percent of claims, while others intimate that attorneys for debtors who purpose to pay more than ten to twenty-five
percent have not provided effective representation to their clients.
Some courts seem to consider the debtor's ability to pay as crucial,
whereas others have refused to confirm low payment plans even
when they represent the debtor's best effort.8 Throughout the
country, courts regularly are confirming plans which provide for
payment of ten to twenty-five percent of claims, and occasionally,
nothing at all.7
Indeed, the main difference between chapter 7 and chapter 13
often seems to be that debtors use chapter 13 when necessary to
deal with mortgage creditors or other secured lenders. For general
creditors, there is no difference-they get little or nothing in either
chapter. 8
Similar variations are found in length of plans. Section 1322(c)
provides that plans may not last more than three years without
court approval, and upon such approval for cause may last for five
years. In applying this standard, some courts confirm plans of any
length so long as they find "good faith," for others, three years is
the norm, and still others are unwilling to permit longer plans.
Again, there is no standard to guide the court.
The absence of definitive standards-for the amount of income to be devoted to the plan, the percentage payment of claims,
and the length of the plan-is the percentage payment of claims,
and the length of the plan is particularly significant because of the
35. See In re Raburn, 4 Bankr. 624 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 1980).
36. In re Murallo, 4 Bankr. 666 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1980) (10% plan not adequate regardless of debtor's financial resources); In re Hall, 4 Bankr. 341 (Bankr.
E.D. Va. 1980) (six percent not adequate even though it is significant in light of
debtors' monthly income).
37. See In re Harper, [1978-1981 Transfer Binder] BANKR. L. REP. (CCH)
68,019 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1981) (1%); In re Cloutier, 3 Bankr. 584 (Bankr. D. Colo.
1980) (0%); In re Harland, 3 Bankr. 597 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1980) (0%); In re Johnson, 6 Bankr. 34 (Bankr. N.D. IMI. 1980) (1%); In re Carter, 9 Bankr. 140 (Bankr.
N.D. Ga. 1981) (0%); In re Celeste, 9 Bankr. 392 (Banker N.D. Ohio 1981) (8%);
In re Walsey, 7 Bankr. 779 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1980) (10%).
38. There is a detailed analysis of the caselaw in the statement of Dean Walter Ray Phillips before the House Judiciary Comm., 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 11-25
(Oct. 22, 1981). Dean Phillips's analysis shows the wide divergence among courts
as to the appropriate standard for confirming chapter 13 plans. In our judgment,
a fair reading of his testimony indicates a need for a much clearer legislative
statement of the appropriate standards.
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litigation-oriented approach of the Code to resolving disputes. It
has been noted that the economics of consumer bankruptcies are
such that consumer creditors simply cannot afford to litigate these
issues in typical cases. In other words, the absence of standards
provides a great benefit to the person who applies the standard in
the first instance (the debtor), and a significant handicap to the
party that much litigate to change it (the creditor). When such litigation is not feasible, the absence of a definitive standard is tantamount to letting the debtor set the standard and to making that
standard nonreviewable. In other words, it is essential that any
standard be sufficiently definite so that it provides a clear guide to
what the law requires, and so that case by case litigation is not
necessary for the standard to be applied fairly.
RECOMMENDATION

Chapter 7. This problem can be approached by recognizing that bankruptcy relief is not something which should be available for the asking. Instead, it is a form of equitable relief which
should be justified by the exigencies of the consumer's financial
condition.
It is recommended that creditors be permitted to seek dismissal of a bankruptcy case filed by a debtor who can pay a reasonable
portion of his debts out of future income. The first consideration in
such cases must be the amount needed for the future support of
the debtor and his family. Debtors who lack adequate income to do
more than that should be discharged in bankruptcy. No purpose is
served by trying to get the last ounce of flesh out of a beleaguered
debtor. And, no purpose is served by imposing the social and psychological pressure of debt which the debtor simply cannot be expected to pay. On the other hand, in some cases the debtor's future
needs will still permit some payments to creditors. If creditors can
convince the court that the debtor can pay a reasonable portion of
his debts, the chapter 7 case would be dismissed. But even then,
the debtor is not without remedy. The debtor still can file a chapter 13 petition, file a proceeding under a state or local debtor rehabilitation statute, or participate in a formal or informal credit
counseling program.
This standard would make bankruptcy law consistent with the
premises upon which consumer credit is granted. That is, the
credit risk taken by the creditor is that the consumer's income will
prove to be inadequate to pay debts. If the debtor's income is inadequate, the credit risk has materialized, and a bankruptcy proceed-
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ing is warranted. On the other hand, the risk that creditors do not
assume is that a consumer who can pay a reasonable portion of his
debts simply will decide to avoid debts through the expediency of
a bankruptcy proceeding. No public policy is served by permitting
such persons to avoid their debts through the bankruptcy system.
There is a tendency in some quarters to view this proposal in
apocalyptic terms. That is, only the poverty stricken, destitute and
infirm will be eligible for bankruptcy relief. This is, however, a
smokescreen to avoid debate on the underlying issue. The simple
fact is that roughly two-thirds of present debtors would be totally
unaffected by this recommendation. These are persons who lack
significant debt paying capacity; for them, public policy and common notions of decency require bankruptcy relief. What is being
talked about, then, is a sizeable minority of current debtors who
are, in a sense, taking undue advantage of the availability of bankruptcy relief. The focus of the debate must be on this group of
persons."9 Critics should not be permitted to obscure the debate by
stating the truism that many persons need bankruptcy relief, and
concluding that bankruptcy should be available to everyone on request. This is a nonsequitur. The basic issue which must be faced
is whether persons who do not need bankruptcy relief should, nevertheless, be permitted to obtain such relief. So far as the Subcommittee is aware, there is a general consensus that bankruptcy
should not be available to persons who do not need it.
It is likewise suggested that bankruptcy courts will apply the
standard in different ways, but it is not clear what this proves.
Simply because there is an absence of complete uniformity does
not mean that the principle itself is unsound. Indeed, flexibility
and individual application have been the hallmark of courts of equity for hundreds of years. Moreover, for cases which stray too far,
there is the supervisory power of appellate courts. Finally, the argument proves too much since courts regularly consider debt paying ability in chapter 13 cases, student loans and exemption cases.
There is no more reason to doubt the courts' ability to apply such
standards to chapter 7 cases, than there is in other areas.
39. See JOHNSON, supra note 10, at 55-64. Consumer spokesmen have recognized that some persons are using bankruptcy who should not be permitted to do
so. There are, as might be expected, differences as to who is in this group. But,
there does not seem to be opposition to the principle that persons who have substantial debt paying capacity should be excluded. See Testimony of Prof. P.
Shuchman before the Subcomm. on Monopolies and Commercial Law of the
House Judiciary Comm., 97th Cong., 1st Sees. 71-72, 90-91 (Oct. 22, 1981).
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To implement such a recommendation, the Code should require the debtor to provide information on estimated income and
expenses. Such information, together with any testimony derived
from the meeting of creditors, the loan file, and the debtor's schedules, would enable creditors to determine whether there is a basis
for believing that the debtor has reasonable debt paying ability.
Creditors should be given a reasonable time after the meeting of
creditors to seek dismissal of the case is they believe a case can be
made that the debtor does not need bankruptcy relief.
It is sometimes suggested that such a standard if too elusive
for the courts to apply, that the proposal would flood the courts
with constant motions to dismiss bankruptcy cases, or that debtors
will be oppressed by bad faith filings by creditors. Each of these
suggestions is, in the judgment of this Subcommittee, mistaken.
Standard. As to the standard, the Subcommittee simply would
note that bankruptcy courts apply similar standards every day in
connection with other provisions of the Code. For example, a similar determination must be made under chapter 13 as it now stands,
or under changes which have been recommended. 40 Various exemptions for insurance awards and tort recoveries are based on anticipated family income and expense levels. 4 1 Finally, in determining the dischargeability of student loans, courts must make
precisely the kind of determination involved herein - whether the
debtor can pay off the student loan without creating undue hard42
ship to his family.
Increase in litigation. The adoption of such a recommendation
would not lead to an increase in bankruptcy court proceedings. In
fact, it could decrease overall litigation in the bankruptcy court.
We have already noted that there are strong economic deterrents to creditor litigation in bankruptcy. To establish that a
debtor can pay a reasonable portion of his debts out of future income, creditors must bear the expense of gathering the facts concerning the debtor's financial circumstances, probably will have to
attend the meeting of creditors, and must participate in a trial on
the merits. Creditors will not incur the expense of such a proceeding unless they are relatively certain of prevailing and unless the
amount that the debtor can pay on the debt (either outside of
40. 11 U.S.C. § 1325; supra pp. 254-55. See, e.g., In re Kull, 12 Bankr. 654
(Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1981); In re Rimgale, 669 F.2d 426 (7th Cir. 1982).

41. 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(10)(D), (E); 522(d)(11)(B), (C), (E).
42. Id. § 523(a)(8)(B).
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bankruptcy, as part of a state insolvency proceeding, or in chapter
13) justifies the expense. In practice, only creditors with large
claims will litigate, and they only will litigate when the possible
recovery is substantial. This analysis finds strong confirmation in
the chapter 13 experience where creditors simply have not been
willing to litigate on questions relating to the amount or length of
the plan unless the possible benefit was substantial. It also should
be noted that, despite predictions of an avalanche of litigation
when the bankruptcy court was given jurisdiction over dischargeability issues, this has not occurred. Instead, creditors tend
to litigate only when they have a substantial economic stake and
think that they have a very good chance of winning.""
Other factors, too, will tend to discourage extensive litigation.
For one, after a short shakeout period, the courts are likely to develop standards to identify debtors who can pay a reasonable portion of their debts. This tends to discourage filings by debtors who
can do so in the first instance, and litigation by creditors in cases
where debtors cannot pay their debts. Moreover, provision might
be made for creditors to bear the debtor's costs and attorney's fees
in cases of bad faith filings.
It may be that the recommendation would decrease overall
bankruptcy litigation. This is because much present litigation involves indirect attempts by creditors to reach post-petition income
of debtors who have substantial debt-paying ability. Examples are
creditors' attempts to have debts declared nondischargeable, to obtain reaffirmations, and to increase valuation of property subject to
security interests. Such litigation would become much less likely if
debtors who had substantial debt paying ability were not using
bankruptcy in the first place.
Consumer Oppression. Any provision which may deny debtors
.access to bankruptcy relief is subject to possible abuse by creditors
who seek to deny such relief to persons who need such a remedy.
Creditors might undertake such litigation to coerce a post-petition
payment, or for simple malevolent motives. While the Subcommit43. It is sometimes argued that creditors will readily litigate because they can
use common forms and can litigate at minimal expense. This argument shows a
misunderstanding of the present recommendation. Creditors will have to carry

out at least some pretrial investigation, and will have to participate in at least one
hearing on the question whether the debtor needs bankruptcy relief. At the hearing, creditors will have the burden of showing the debtor can in fact pay a reasonable portion of debts. Such a showing cannot be made, without a substantial investment of time, effort and expense.
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tee does not believe that such litigation would be widespread, it
also believes that debtors must be protected against unfounded litigation undertaken for ulterior purposes. For this reason, the Subcommittee recommends that provision should be made for the
debtor to seek an award of costs and attorney's fees from creditors
who undertake such litigation in bad faith. Such provision would
provide the necessary protection to debtors against unfounded
litigation.
The Subcommittee's recommendation redresses the drastic inbalance caused by imposing an assets-based system of bankruptcy
upon an income-based system of consumer credit. Consumers lose
the incentive to use bankruptcy to rid themselves of unwanted
debt. But the remedy remains available to those who truly need
relief because of an inability to pay debts out of future income.
And, the recommendation is entirely consistent with the understanding of the parties to consumer credit transactions - that
debts will be paid if the debtor has sufficient income above family
needs to pay it.
Chapter 13. A Chapter 13 proceeding involves substantial
benefits to the debtor in being able to retain his property, avoid
most nondischargeable debts, and cram-down debts of secured
creditors (that is, force them to accept repayment on different
terms). The quid pro quo for such benefits should be a substantial
effort by the debtor to pay his debts. Of course, the first criterion
in such cases must again be the debtor's obligations to support
himself and his family. But beyond that, it is necessary to have a
definite standard for how much of the debtor's future income
should be committed to the plan. Moreover, as noted, the economic realities are such that creditors simply cannot litigate the
issues. If the standard is indefinite, then the debtor, in reality, will
determine the standard.
Chapter 13 relief is essentially equitable, and contemplates a
substantial effort by the debtor to pay his debts. Such an effort, by
definition, may require some sacrifices by the debtor, and some alteration in pre-petition consumption levels. Thus, the debtor
should be required to devote that portion of his income to the plan
which is not necessary for support of the debtor and his family.
The courts may be expected to determine norms for such support,
and Labor Department cost of living figures may provide some
help.
The question of length is not easily resolved. However, in the
past decade, we have witnessed an increasing willingness of con-
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sumers to incur longer term debt for other transactions than first

mortgages on residential property. For example, members of our
Subcommittee report that maturities of car loans often are four to
five years, and the maturities of credit sales of appliances often are
three years. Many consumers have made second mortgage loans using the equity in their homes, and maturities usually extend over
five to ten years or more. Given the consumer's willingness to incur
relatively lone maturities for traditional consumer loans, it is reasonable to set a five year maturity when short term debt is being
converted into longer term debt.
On the other hand, there should be an incentive to a consumer
to complete his plan within a shorter period of time. For this reason, shorter plans should be authorized for consumers who propose
to pay a substantial portion of allowed unsecured claims. Given
the need for a chapter 13 proceeding in the first place, the debtor's
completion of a plan providing for a substantial payment of his
debts should be an effective termination point.
Enforcing Secured Claims
NATURE OF THE PROBLEM

One of the most severe problems created by the Code involves
the enforcement of rights of creditors which are undisputed. That
is, the Code imposes such high "transaction costs" on the enforcement of certain rights, that the rights themselves become of little
value. This is most clearly evident in connection with the rights of
creditors who have a security interest or lien upon the debtor's
property which is enforceable in bankruptcy. In most cases, the
rights are themselves not disputed or questioned.
When the debtor files a bankruptcy petition, property which is
security for consumer debts is almost invariably in the hands of
the debtor. The debtor generally has several options with respect
to such property. The debtor may claim the property as wholly or
partially exempt, may seek to redeem the property, or may seek to
retain the property by reaffirming all or part of the underlying
debt. Or, the debtor may decide to surrender the property to the
secured creditor. The trustee also has a potential interest in such
property although this interest is largely theoretical. In the typical
case, the property will be worth less than the amount of the debt
or any "equity" will be exempt, and the trustee will disclaim any
interest in the property.
Under normal principles of commercial law, if a consumer
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does not pay a secured debt, the creditor can take either judicial or
nonjudicial steps to recover the collateral." Unfortunately, when
the debtor files a bankruptcy petition the Code provides no orderly
mechanism for enforcing the undisputed interest of the secured
creditor. The debtor himself is not required to return the property
or exercise one of the other opinions by a designated time. Theoretically, the secured creditor could request this relief at the meeting of creditors, but the absence of the bankruptcy judge makes it
impossible to resolve secured claims, or even to get the debtor to
elect one of his options.
Alternatively, the matter might be resolved by contacting the
trustee, and some have argued that the trustee has a duty to pick
up and deliver secured property.4' In practice, nothing of the sort
is taking place. The trustee often is unfamiliar with secured claims,
and usually intends to abandon the property since its value is less
than the creditor's lien. Also, trustees are reluctant to expend estate assets to benefit secured claimants; often, since there are minimal amounts available to pay priority claims, trustees would not be
fully compensated for such efforts.
The secured claimant is also barred from the kind of direct
action permitted under normal principles of commercial law.
Thus, both before and after the meeting of creditors, the automatic
stay bars direct communication with the debtor. This is a particularly acute problem if the debtor is not represented by counsel (in
which case there is no one to speak with at all), or is represented
by counsel who cannot be reached or who is unfamiliar with the
particulars of the case involving the secured claimant. Prior to discharge, the automatic stay clearly prohibits any attempt to seize
the property. Creditors even are wary about seizing the property
after discharge because of uncertainty over this right, and the existence of the post-discharge injunction against collection efforts. 46
In sum, under the present Code provisions, there is a hiatus of
from several weeks to many months during which the debtor has
possession of the property, uses the property, and is not required
to make any effort to resolve the interest of the secured creditor.
During that time, the property will depreciate in value due to normal use, and may be lost or destroyed. Ultimately, if the interest is
not resolved, the secured creditor must incur the considerable ex44. See U.C.C. § 9-503.
45. See 11 U.S.C. § 704(1).
46. Id. § 524(a).
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pense of bringing a separate contested or adversary proceeding to
obtain relief from the stay and injunction, so that the creditor can
enforce its lien. In practice, the costs of such a proceeding rarely
are less than $500, and may be considerably more if several court
appearances are required. Moreover, the debtor continues to retain and use the property for the time it takes to conclude the
proceeding.
This is a clear instance where the Code has imposed excessive
costs on secured creditors who seek to enforce their undisputed
rights to secured property. The costs are not imposed so that the
debtor can exercise rights of his own; rather, there simply are no
procedures for resolving such rights at an early stage of the proceedings or at the least possible cost. The effect of the present
scheme is to diminish substantially the rights of secured creditors,
and, in many instances, to deprive them of their security entirely.
RECOMMENDATION

Any solution must begin by recognizing that secured creditors
have a substantial interest in secured property.' Moreover, the
fact that the enforcement of undisputed rights is involved suggests
that any solution should be one which allows prompt action and
seeks to minimize the cost of enforcing such rights.
The present predicament could be resolved if the debtor were
required to notify the secured creditor of his intention with regard
to the property at an early stage of the proceedings. This should
not unduly burden the debtor who will have to resolve such issues
in the course of deciding whether to file a petition in the first
place. The notice should also be given to the trustee so that the
trustee can assert any potential interest of the estate to such
property.
Thereafter, the debtor should be required to perform his
stated intention by the time of the meeting of creditors. If there
are disputes, as for example, where the debtor seeks to redeem but
there is a dispute over value, these can be resolved at the meeting
of creditors or at another time if directed by the court. If the
debtor has not performed by the meeting, the bankruptcy judge
may order him to do so. In the rare case where there is some dispute that cannot be resolved by the meeting, or where the trustee
asserts an interest in such property, the court can continue the
stay until the dispute is resolved.
47. See, e.g., Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600 (1974).

[1982:2391

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS

As essential element of this solution is, however, that the automatic stay expire after the meeting of creditors so that the secured
creditor can then enforce its lien without the expense of a separate
proceeding. Such a result is justified by the long-standing principle
that valid liens pass through bankruptcy unaffected and may be
enforced afterwards. 8 If the debtor wants to assert any interest in
such property, he should be required to do so early in the proceedings or not at all.
In some situations, the bankruptcy court will take no action
with regard to property which is subject to security interests or
liens. The debtor may retain the property and continue making
payments to the creditor. Or, the debtor may have made an agreement to redeem the property or reaffirm the debt' according to a
schedule, and have defaulted on the payments.
Although it seems relatively clear that Congress intended valid
liens to be enforceable notwithstanding a bankruptcy discharge so
that a creditor may retake the collateral from defaulting debtors,
section 524(a)(2) could be interpreted to require the creditor to obtain a court order to take such action." The Code should be clarified to make it clear that creditors do not need court authorization
to enforce liens which have not been avoided in bankruptcy and
thus remain valid and enforceable.
Exemptions and Security Interests in Exempt Property
NATURE OF THE PROBLEM

Exemptions are especially significant in an assets-based system of bankruptcy. To the extent property is exempt, such property will not be available to pay the claims of creditors. A system
which excludes future income and then excludes substantial present assets through exemptions effectively insures that creditors
will receive little or no distribution in bankruptcy. Moreover, as
exemption levels rise, the cost of bankruptcy decreases, and more
debtors may be expected to use bankruptcy to avoid unwanted
48. H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 351, 357, 369, reprinted in 1978

U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5963, 6307, 6312-13, 6315-16; S. REP. No. 989, 95th
Cong., 2d Sess. 76, reprintedin 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 5787, 5861-62;
In re Honaker, 4 Bankr. 415 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1980); In re Grimes, 7 BANKR.

CT. DEC. (CRR) 576 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1981).
However, confusing language in the Code has led some courts to hold otherwise. See Countryman, supra note 31, at 16-17.
49. See Countryman, supra note 31, at 16-17.
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debts.
Under the Code, the debtor has a choice of a set of federal
exemptions or the exemptions provided by the state in which the
debtor resides. 50 The states can enact legislation to prevent their
citizens from electing federal exemptions, and to date, slightly
more than two-thirds of the states have done so. If there are joint
debtors and both elect federal exemptions, all exemptions are
doubled. Alternatively, one debtor can elect federal exemptions
and the other debtor state exemptions.
Substantial aggregate amounts of property may be exempted
under the Code provisions. For example, for joint debtors, each
item of household furniture, clothing, and similar items may be exempt up to $400 in value; there is no aggregate limit. The homestead exemption permits individual debtors to exempt $7500 of equity in a homestead; joint debtors may exempt $15,000. If the
debtor does not have a homestead or does not want to exempt a
homestead, the $7500 exemption (or $15,000 exemption for joint
debtors) may be applied as a "wild card" to any other property.
Equity in a car is exempt up to $1200 for individual debtors, and
$2400 for joint debtors. There are other exemptions for tools of the
trade, compensation awards, insurance, burial plots, and musical
instruments. Altogether, the Code has eleven separate subsections
specifying exempt property, and many of these subsections have
numerous types of included items. Moreover, the above are federal
exemptions and if one joint debtor elects state exemptions and the
other federal exemptions, then one debtor may use the entire state
exemption even though it was actually designed to be used for a
family unit - that is, the same exemption level applies whether
invoked by one spouse or both spouses.
Ordinarily, creditors could be expected to try to minimize the
impact of exemptions by taking a security interest in otherwise exempt property. But here, section 522(0(2) invalidates nonpurchase
money security interests in exempt household items and tools of
the trade. Debtors can use their "wild card" to increase the value
of exempt property subject to the lien avoidance provisions. 5
And, if a state exempts all household goods or all tools of the
trade, or high value limitations, then nonpurchase money security
interests in substantial assets may be invalidated.
50. 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(1).
51. See In re Eagan, 16 Bankr. 439 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1982) (pickup truck
used as tool of trade worth $2500; nonpurchase-money security interest avoided).
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Even in situations where creditors have obtained a purchase
money security interest, or security interests in property other
than household goods or tools of the trade, the security interest is
not fully protected. The consumer may redeem these goods by paying their "value," and not the amount of the debt. The standards
for determining value are elusive, and it often is uneconomic for
creditors to litigate value questions. In such cases, value is, in essence, the amount set by debtors. When the issue has been litigated, courts often interpret value to mean wholesale value or close
52
to wholesale value.
Alternatively, the debtor may file a chapter 13 case, and "cram
down" the plan against the creditor by paying the "value" in installments. Again, creditors often cannot economically litigate valuation, and when it has been litigated, wholesale value is frequently used as the measure. In both cases, the difference between
the debt and the "value" is a general claim.
Cumulatively, the exemptions, lien avoidance and redemption
provisions have an important impact on encouraging bankruptcies
and on reducing the assets available for distribution.
RECOMMENDATION

Exemptions. Exemption laws are an essential element of
bankruptcy relief. However, a number of excesses have developed
which tend to encourage the filing of bankruptcy cases and are not
necessary for the debtor's continued economic well-being. Such
excesses should be modified. One possible approach is to again repose control of exemptions with the states. Another is to limit aggregate amounts of exempt property, and eliminate the stacking of
federal and state exemptions.
Valuation. Because the litigation costs preclude judicial
resolution of value questions, it is essential that there be a precise
standard for valuing exempt property. The Subcommittee recommends that a retail market value be adopted. This is most easily
applied by reference to prices in the field, and often may be determined from industry guides. Moreover, since consumers buy property for use in the ordinary course and not for resale, it would be
appropriate to measure value in terms of resale value. There is no
justification for penalizing creditors for the immediate market drop
52. See In re Crockett, 3 Bankr. 365 (Bankr. N.D. IMI.1980) (wholesale); In re
McLeod, 5 Bankr. 520 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1980)(between wholesale and retail
"value" in installments).
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in the value of consumer goods after purchase, when such goods
are not purchased for resale but for ordinary use and consumption.
Nonpurchase-Money Security Interest. The purpose of
avoiding nonpurchase money security interests in household goods
and tools of the trade was to preserve property which is necessary
to the debtor's "fresh start." That fresh start could be impaired if
the debtor had to pay the full amount of the debt to retain goods
which were necessary for minimal living standards, and which had
a high replacement value.
The present provision is a classic example of overkill. The provision recognizes the debtor's need for the goods, and makes the
unwarranted assumption that if the security interest is valid, the
debtor will lose the goods, and then invalidates the security interest in toto to avoid such a result. Such a scheme creates a serious
imbalance in the rights of debtors and creditors. Moreover, it effectively precludes consumers from making loans secured by such articles since the security interest will not be valid in bankruptcy.
The result is either severe economic loss to the creditor or effectively depriving the consumer of the ability to use his own property as security.
The rights of the debtors and creditors can be better balanced,
and the objective of Congress enabling the debtor to retain property necessary for a fresh start can be preserved, without the punitive provision now in the Code. Rather than invalidating the security interest entirely, the debtor should be permitted to redeem the
property over a five year period. The redemption price will be determined by the market price. This approach is consistent with the
expectation of both the consumer and the creditor that the consumer will pay for the goods out of future income and not the proceeds of sale. Moreover, it is consistent with the consumer's desire
to redeem the property. Such redemption indicates that the consumer wants to continue the underlying transaction.
Dischargeabilityof Fraud Claims
NATURE OF THE PROBLEM

There has long been a provision in bankruptcy law that declares that debts procured by fraud or false financial statements
are nondischargeable. Developments under the Code have, unfortunately, tended to render this important provision largely ineffective. There is a need to strengthen this deterrent to unconscionable and fraudulent conduct.
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* One problem which has developed recently has involved misstatements of non-financial information such as length of time at
residence or on the job, or even the nature of the job. Such information is often sought on credit applications, frequently is given
considerable weight by modern credit scoring systems, and must be
identified (if appropriate) as a significant factor in the denial of
credit. In this connection, recent industry experience shows a
growing incidence of inaccurate information on non-financial matters. In recent years, this has become an especially serious problem
since applicant-provided information is often used by creditors because of various limitations (e.g., Fair Credit Reporting, privacy)
on obtaining information from external sources. Yet, it is not at
all clear that debts may be nondischargeable for these misstatements.
Another problem is section 523(d), which imposes attorney's
fees on a creditor who objects to the discharge of a debt because of
fraud, false pretenses or a false financial statement, and whose objection is not upheld. This provision is virtually mandatory and
has been interpreted as such even when the creditor was acting in
good faith. 8
The practical effect of this provision is to preclude creditor
objections in all but the clear and obvious cases. That is, a creditor
who obtains a judgment holding a debt nondischargeable must first
deduct its own attorney's fees from the amount of the nondischargeable debt, and then further discount the remainder by the
probability that it will not be recovered. A creditor who loses such
litigation not only must pay its own attorney's fees, but those of
the debtor as well. Unless the debt is especially large, or the
probability of winning extremely high, such litigation does not
make economic sense.
Debts incurred within a short time of the petition present special issues. Ordinarily, the debtor is insolvent during this time."
Moreover, the debtor has a strong incentive to incure dischargeable debts for either consumables or exempt property.55 During
53. See In re Schlickmann, 6 Bankr. 281 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1980) (fee of $2600

assessed against creditor whose discharged complaint was brought in good faith;
court said its "hands tied"); In re Folster, 8 BANKR. CT. Dac. (CRR) 755 (Bankr.
D. Hawaii 1982)(debtor did not act fraudulently); In re Majewski; 7 Bankr. 904
(Bankr. D. Conn. 1981).
54. See 11 U.S.C. § 547(a)(4) (presumption of insolvency for 90 days before
petition).

55. It generally is held that the conversion of nonexempt into exempt prop-
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this period it is not likely that most creditors would extend credit
if properly informed of the consumer's true financial condition;
and thus, such debts are inherently of a suspicious nature. Nevertheless, it often is difficult to prove such debts are fraudulent and,
given the deterrents to litigate already noted, the effect of the
Code is to validate many fraudulently incurred debts.
RECOMMENDATION

To resolve these issues, several recommendations are offered.
First, the provision governing fraudulently incurred debts should
make clear that fraud includes a false representation relating to
the debtor's credit history or other facts reasonably related to the
debtor's incurring liability for the debt. This would make the Code
provision consistent with the type of information sought and used
to make credit decisions.
Second, there should be a presumption that a debt incurred
within a short time of the petition has been incurred in circumstances that would make the debt nondischargeable. This recommendation also deters "loading up" and last minute spending
sprees on the eve of bankruptcy. Under the recommendation, the
debtor still will be able to show the debt was not fraudulent.
Finally, the one-sided nature of the provision imposing attorney's fees on creditors who fall to establish that a debt is nondischargeable because it was fraudulently incurred should be altered.
Attorney's fees should be imposed when the creditor does not
bring the proceeding in good faith. While this will still require the
creditors to undertake a careful examination of the issues before
deciding to litigate, it will not penalize those litigants who are
making a good faith attempt to assert rights which they have
under the Code.
Reaffirmation
NATURE OF THE PROBLEM

Under the old act, there were no controls on reaffirmation.
Consumers sometimes made improvident reaffirmations, and some
creditors apparently made it a practice to seek reaffirmations by
offering recently discharged debtors a small amount of new cash as
part of a transaction reaffirming an original debt.
erty, even on the eve of bankruptcy, is not a fraudulent conveyence. E.g., In re
Jackson, 472 F.2d 589 (9th Cir. 1973); H. R. REP. No. 595, supra note 48, at 360.
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The result was a change in procedure requiring court approval
of reaffirmations. Before approval, the judge first must explain reaffirmation to the debtor, and then find that the agreement is in
the debtor's best interests; that it does not impose an undue burden on the debtor or his dependents. Also, the reaffirmation may
be rescinded within thirty days."
Experience under the Code has shown that many debtors have
important reasons to want to reaffirm debt. The debtor may seek
to reaffirm in order to settle litigation over the validity of liens, the
standards for redemption or the dischargeability of a debt, or may
agree to pay debts when there is a co-debtor. In many cases, the
debtor may wish to reaffirm a debt for reasons other than pure
economics.5 7 The debt may be owed to a friend, relative or employer, or to a credit union where the debtor has a close personal
relationship with other members. The debt may be owed to a family doctor or other tradesman, from whom the debtor hopes to obtain service on credit in the future.
In these cases, the Code imposes considerable transaction
costs on reaffirmations which the debtor desires to make. Indeed,
in some cases these costs may preclude reaffirmations which enable
the debtor to redeem secured property or settle dischargeability
disputes becuase, in practice, creditors must incur costs to appear
at reaffirmation hearings. Moreover, secured creditors may be especially prejudiced if the debtor continues to use property subject
to a security interest in the expectation that the reaffirmation
agreement will be approved, only to find the agreement rejected
several months later.
RECOMMENDATION

The present provisions evidence an excessively paternalistic
approach to reaffirmation. The important objective of Congress
was to insure that the debtor did not make hasty or ill-considered
reaffirmations, at a time when judgment might be clouded by the
financial pressures and the experience of bankruptcy. This objective can be fulfilled, and the transaction costs of reaffirmation reduced substantially, if the debtor is permitted to reaffirm without
court approval, provided that the reaffirmation may be rescinded
for sixty days. Such a lengthy period should provide ample time
56. 11 U.S.C. § 524(c), (d).
57. See In re Avis, 3 Bankr. 205 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1980); In re Long, 3
Bankr. 656 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1980).
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for the debtor to reconsider improvident agreements and to discuss
the matter with his family and counsel. Morever, the debtor continues to be protected from any possible harrassment by the automatic stay in section 362 and the post-discharge injunction in section 524(a).
Discharge Hearing; Meeting of Creditors
NATURE OF THE PROBLEM

The Code requires that a meeting of creditors be held within a
reasonable time after the petition is filed. The bankruptcy judge is
not permitted to attend this meeting. The Code also requires a socalled "discharge hearing" to be held after the court has determined to grant a discharge. The hearing is designed to explain the
discharge and to pass on reaffirmations. The bankruptcy judge presides at the discharge hearing.
This scheme is a reversal of prior practice under which the
bankruptcy judge presided at the so-called "first meeting of creditors" and there was no discharge hearing at all. The bankruptcy
judge was excluded from the meeting of creditors because of the
fear that he would be exposed to information which might affect
the issues in subsequently litigated proceedings involving the
debtor or trustee and third parties. Moreover, the Code provisions
envisioned the meeting as essentially administrative; and since the
judge's administrative role was virtually eliminated, there was little
reason for him to be present at the meeting. At the same time, it
was thought that the debtor should appear before the court at
least once during the bankruptcy case, and thus, the discharge
hearing was devised to serve this purpose. It was also hoped that
during the discharge hearing the court could counsel the debtor
and pass on any reaffirmations.
In practice, the benefits of excluding the judge from the meeting of creditors and requiring the discharge hearing have been elusive, and the removal of the judge from the meeting of creditors
has caused unforeseen difficulties. The Code provisions neglected
to recognize that the bankruptcy judge performed vital judicial
functions at the meeting of creditors which simply cannot be performed by others in his absence. For example, we have already
noted that the debtor typically will have possession of property
subject to secured claims, and only the judge can direct the debtor
to return the property. Since the judge is not present, such disputes must now be resolved in separate contested or adversary pro-
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ceedings with their attendant delay and substantial additional expense. Moreover, the absence of the judge at this critical stage
tends to minimize the social impact and seriousness of the bankruptcy court proceedings, and may make it appear to affected creditors that bankruptcy is simply another governmental program for
indigent relief.
In actual practice, the discharge hearing has created numerous
unforeseen difficulties. In many larger districts, the hearings and
explanations are held on a group basis and there is neither time
nor opportunity for the kind of individual attention the Code contemplated. In all cases, the debtor must lose an additional day of
work. There are no specific penalities for not appearing at the discharge hearing, and many districts enter a discharge notwithstanding the debtor's absence. Other districts try to reschedule the hearing. Finally, there is the administrative burden of determining the
validity of various excuses for nonattendance, and deciding requests for rescheduling.
The cumulative impact of the present arrangement has been
to substantially increase the cost of bankruptcy proceedings to
both debtor and creditor.
RECOMMENDATION

The difficulties noted above could be resolved if the bankruptcy judge were present at the meeting of creditors in consumer
cases and if the discharge hearing were eliminated. Thus, the judge
could convene the meeting and, though not at all times present,
would be empowered to resolve the kinds of inherently judicial
matters which may arise at this meeting. Also, the judge could provide whatever counseling is deemed appropriate. Indeed, this
might have more impact than does the system under the existing
Code since the bankruptcy experience will still be fresh and real,
and the recommended approach would emphasize the judicial nature of a bankruptcy proceeding.
On the other hand, the judge would not preside over the entire
meeting. The judge might leave the meeting when the "judicial"
phase has ended, or when questions arise relating to the administration of the debtor's estate. To the extent that the meeting is
used to examine the debtor about his affairs, the judge would likewise not be present.
The recommendation thus retains the benefits of the Code approach without imposing the burdens of two meetings, or deferring
substantial business from the first meeting simply because the
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judge is not there. Moreover, because there will still only be one
hearing in a typical case, there should be no additional burden
placed on bankruptcy judges. Indeed, the proposal may result in a
net saving of judicial time because it will eliminate the need for
separate proceedings on a host of relatively simple or noncontroversial matters which could be resolved in connection with the
meeting.
Preferences
NATURE OF THE PROBLEM

The Code provides that preferences are invalid, and may be
avoided (recovered) by the trustee. 58 A preference is a payment on
an unsecured debt within ninety days of the petition, or the giving
of security on an unsecured debt within ninety days of the petition. This would include payment of charge accounts and unsecured notes even if the creditor has not in any way encouraged
the payment. These preferences also were avoidable under the
Bankruptcy Act, but only if the creditor had reason to know that
the debtor was insolvent. Since consumer creditors receiving regular payments did not have such reasonable cause, regular payments
usually could not be avoided.
The Code provision has made virtually all payments of consumer debts within ninety days avoidable by the trustee.59 The effect has been extremely disruptive of consumer accounts, and extremely costly to creditors. This cost would be justified if the
amounts were ultimately distributed to all creditors through the
bankruptcy system, but this generally has not occurred. Instead,
the practical effect has been an increase in the amounts available
to pay administrative fees, including the fees incurred in collecting
the amount in the first place. In this connection, the administrative expense of collecting small amounts is so high that it is rare
that any amount actually is distributed to creditors. Thus, the im58. 11 U.S.C. § 547.
59. There is an exception for ordinary course payments within 45 days of the
time a debt is incurred. This provision does not provide any protection for retail
installment obligations since the debts are not incurred within 45 days of the payment. Moreover, it often does not protect payments for purchases on credit because retail purchases frequently are not billed and paid within 45 days. Also, in
the case of charge account purchases, payments often must be applied to earlier
debts rather than purchases which have been made within 45 days. See In re
Williams, 5 Banker, 706 (Banker, S.D. Ohio 1980); U.C.C.C. 3.03(2).

[1982:2391

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS

pact of the provision has been to increase both administrative costs
and fees, with no corresponding benefit to the debtor or to any
creditor.
The purpose of preference law has always been to promote
equality among creditors and to deter creditors from applying lastminute pressure in the hope of obtaining better treatment than
they would receive in bankruptcy. In the case of routine payments
of consumer accounts, the provisions accomplish neither objective.
By definition, ordinary course payments do not involve creditor
pressure of a type which is deterred by the preference section.
Moreover, although the provision theoretically promotes equality,
in fact, little or nothing actually trickles down to non-preferred
creditors. Thus, the present provisions impose a considerable cost
on some creditors with no corresponding benefit to other creditors,
thereby adding to overall bankruptcy losses.
RECOMMENDATION

It is submitted that, as applied to consumer transactions, this
is an instance where the Code made an unwarranted change from
provisions of the Act. As noted, the Bankruptcy Act required creditors to have reasonable cause to know of the debtor's insolvency,
and the Subcommittee believes that such a requirement should be
included in the present preference provisions. There is no indication that the elimination of this requirement has been of any benefit to general creditors in consumer cases. Moreover, when consumer creditors receive payments without reasonable cause to
know of insolvency, they do not infringe the basic goals of preference laws. The recipients are unlikely to have applied the kind of
last-minute pressure which is condemned, and the small amounts
involved do not in fact undercut the goal of creditor equality. And,
since such payments tend to be random among creditors, they
should "equal out" over the long run without attempted redistribution in individual cases through the bankruptcy system.
Chapter 13
One of the principal objectives of the Code was to increase the
use of chapter 13 by debtors who were encountering financial difficulties. Thus, a number of provisions in chapter 13 strongly encourage debtors to use it instead of chapter 7. We have identified
the following serious problem areas.
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CO-DEBTOR STAY

The Problem. Section 1301 of the Code imposes a codebtor stay; that is, creditors are stayed from trying to recover
debts of the debtor by proceeding against co-debtors during the
pendency of the plan. This provision has the salutary objective of
preventing creditors from undermining chapter 13 plans by trying
to collect debts directly from co-debtors. On the other hand, the
creditor does have a promise from the co-debtor to pay the debt. If
the debtor does not propose to pay it, the creditor should be able
to proceed against the co-debtor.
Unfortunately, the present Code does not strike a fair balance
between creditor and co-debtor. The Code has no specific provision
making it clear when the stay terminates, nor does it have any procedure for resolving doubtful cases simply and expeditiously. For
example, under section 1301(c)(2) the stay continues indefinitely if
the debtor's plan does not propose to pay the claim in full (including interest) unless the creditor affirmatively seeks relief." Moreover, although section 1301(c)(1) permits the creditor to proceed
against a co-debtor who received the actual consideration, the
creditor must again commence a proceeding to obtain relief from
the stay. In both of these cases, creditors have undisputed rights.
But they still must incur the time and expense of a separate court
proceeding to enforce such rights.
Recommendation. Section 1301 should make clear that
the stay terminates when the debtor files a plan which does not
propose to pay the claim in full. It also should provide an informal
mechanism to permit creditors to proceed against the co-debtor
when the plan does not propose to pay the creditor's claim, or
when the debtor did not receive the consideration. Such a mechanism would avoid the costs of a court proceeding if the creditor's
right is not disputed.
TIMING OF PAYMENTS

The Problem. Under present law, payments under a chapter
13 plan frequently do not begin until the plan is confirmed. This
sometimes takes several months or longer. Unfortunately, when
the payments do not begin promptly, the debtor becomes accus60. The creditor must seek relief from the stay if the plan does not propose

to pay interest on the debt as specified in the credit agreement. See In re Di
Domizio, 7 BANKR. CT. DEC. (CRR) 883 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1981).
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tomed to living on money that will not be available once the plan
becomes operational; it may be very difficult to scale down expenditures once the plan begins. Indeed, chapter 13 trustees report that
there is much greater incidence of compliance with the plan when
payments begin promptly, and prompt commencement is required
in some districts by local court rules.
Recommendation. Debtors should be required to begin
making payments to the chapter 13 trustee immediately upon
filing the petition.
SECURED CLAIMS

Section 1322(b)(2). Under section 1322(b)(2), claims secured only by the debtor's principal residence cannot be modified,
but claims secured by the debtor's principal residence and other
collateral may be modified (even if the real estate itself is worth
more than the claim).
Although the purpose of this provision was to prevent debtors
from modifying long-term, fully secured mortgage loans in chapter
13, the provision only partially reflected this purpose. Thus, it applied to all loans secured solely by the debtor's principal residence,
regardless of whether the loan was fully secured. Moreover, it permitted modification of debts fully secured by the debtor's principal
residence if the creditor had taken additional collateral. As a result, the provision penalized creditors who were fully secured by
the debtor's principal residence simply because they took additional collateral.
Cram-Down. Section 1325(a)(5)(B)(ii) now permits the
court to "cram-down" a chapter 13 plan against a secured creditor
by allowing the debtor to pay the value of the collateral as of the
time the plan is effective.
The crucial issues in such cram-down cases are the value of
the collateral and the interest rate on the installment payments.
The Code itself does not provide any'definite standards for valuation. Instead, it simply calls for valuation "in light of the purpose
of the valuation and of the proposed disposition or use of such." 61
The Code has no provisions regarding the appropriate rate of
interest.
This is another instance where the Code sets a vague standard,
and it is uneconomic for creditors to litigate the issue. The practical result is that the debtor applies the standard in the first in61. 11 U.S.C. § 506(a).
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stance, and substantial transaction costs are imposed upon a creditor seeking to upset the value or interest rate set by the debtor. In
the few litigated cases, courts generally have interpreted "value" to
mean "wholesale value," or close to wholesale value, and have determined such value as of the date of confirmation even though the
debtor usually continues to use the property from the date of the
petition."2 Moreover, although the courts have required the debtor
to pay interest on the "value" when paid in installments, many
have set interest at levels which are substantially below the contract rate." In fact, this has sometimes encouraged debtors to use
chapter 13 simply to lower their interest rate on outstanding secured debts.'
These provisions exact a severe penalty from secured claimants. Even though the debtor has essentially reaffirmed the original transaction, the property is valued as if the property were purchased for resale rather than for ordinary use. Consumers do not
buy ordinary consumer goods such as automobiles or furniture for
resale, but for personal, family or household use. The expectation
of both consumer and creditor is that the consumer will pay for the
goods out of future income and not out of the proceeds from selling the property. Indeed, consumer goods usually suffer a substantial decline in value after purchase, and would not be worth the
amount of credit extended. If creditors expected to obtain repayment out of liquidation of the goods, they ordinarily would not be
willing to advance more than one-third or one-half of the purchase
price. In fact, credit sales often involve financing of eighty to
ninety percent or more of the purchase price. Morever, even
though the debtor signifies and carries out his intention to use the
property when the plan is filed, value is not determined until
confirmation.
In addition, although the transaction between the parties is
ongoing, the interest rate is set at rates which are artificially low
which, in effect, require secured creditors to finance part of the
62. See In re Cooper, 7 Bankr. 537 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1980); In re Klein, 7

BANKR. CT. DEC. (CRR) 668 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1981); In re Kibler, 8 Bankr. 957

(Bankr. D. Hawaii 1981) (date of objection to plan); In re Johnson, 8 Bankr. 503
(Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1981).
63. Klein (12%); In re Hyden, 10 Bankr. 21 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio); Johnson
(12%); In re Miller, 4 Bankr. 392 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1980) (12%); In re Crockett, 3
Bankr. 365 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1980).
64. See In re Anderson, 3 Bankr. 160 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1980) (debtor using
chapter 13 to restructure contracts).
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chapter 13 plan. In many cases, courts have set interest rates well
below the creditor's cost to borrow the funds which chapter 13
compels him to advance to the debtor. Although the contract rate
may not be a completely reliable measure of the current value of
money, the courts frequently have set interest rates substantially
below any reasonable estimate of this amount. In this regard, the
transactional costs of litigating compel an arbitrary standard.
Recommendation. Section 1322(b)(2), which does not permit modification of real estate mortgages on the debtor's principal
residence, should apply to all loans which are fully secured by the
real property, regardless of whether the creditor also has taken additional collateral as security.
When the consumer seeks to continue to use consumer goods
pursuant to section 1325(a)(5)(B)(ii), the consumer is indicating a
desire to continue the underlying transaction between the parties.
Accordingly, section 1325(a)(5)(B)(ii), in permitting cram-down,
should require valuation as of the date the plan is filed which is
consistent with the consumer's continued use of the property, and
should require payments at the contract rate of interest. The recommendation would value the secured claim according to retail
market value rather than to the liquidation value approach of the
present case law."
NONDISCHARGEABLE CLAIMS

The Problem. Section 523(a) specifies a number of claims
which are not dischargeable in bankruptcy. This means that the
debtor remains obligated to pay such claims, and that they may be
collected from post-petition earnings and property.
In chapter 13, all of these claims are dischargeable except for
alimony and support claims.6 They are dischargeable even if the
debtor proposes to pay little or nothing in satisfaction of the
claims. And, although chapter 13 requires unsecured creditors to
receive as much in chapter 13 as they would in chapter 7, this has
been interpreted to assure chapter 13 claimants only as much as
they would receive from a liquidation of the debtor's present prop65. See In re Damron, 8 Bankr. 323 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1980) (debtor purchased furniture and appliances for $4800 ten months before filing chater 13 petition; property values for cram-down purposes at $2000 even though in "like new"
condition).
66. Tax claims technically are dischargeable, but most of them must be paid
in full as part of the plan. See 11 U.S.C. § 1322(a)(2).
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erty.6 7 But, such a standard does not consider the fact that creditors with nondischargeable claims have access to post-petition
earnings and property.
These provisions effectively undermine section 523(a) in several important respects. First, they permit persons with nondischargeable claims effectively to avoid section 523(a) by filing a
chapter 13 plan providing for small payments to creditors with
nondischargeable claims.' 8 Second, other provisions of chapter 13
encourage debtors to propose the smallest possible chapter 13 payout. Under chapter 13, if a debtor proposes a ten percent payout
and completes the plan, the nondischargeable claim is fully discharged. But if the debtor proposes a fifty percent plan and receives a so-called "hardship discharge" after paying twenty-five
percent of the claim, the claim is not discharged. 69 Obviously, a
debtor with nondischargeable claims would propose the lowest
payout to assure completion of the plan and dischargeability of the
otherwise nondischargeable claims. Third, because nondischargeable claims are not given special treatment in chapter 13, section
1322(b) probably forbids the creditor with a nondischargeable
claim from being treated differently from other unsecured
creditors.70
RECOMMENDATION

There should be parallel treatment between nondischargeable
claims in chapter 13 and chapter 7. Accordingly, such claims
should not be dischargeable in chapter 13. But, debtors still should
have an incentive to use chapter 13. Thus, debtors should be permitted to place these claims in a separate class to facilitate their
payment. The creditor holding a nondischargeable claim would receive exactly the same treatment under the chapter 13 plan as he
could reasonably expect under chapter 7. At the same time, the
debtor still will retain an incentive to use chapter 13. Such claims
can be paid in installments and creditors will be stayed from collecting while the case is pending. Furthermore, if the debtor ob67. E.g., In re Hudson, 7 BANKR. CT. Dsc. 354 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1981); In re
Carter, 9 Bankr. 140 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1981); In re Marlow, 3 Bankr. 305 (Bankr.
N.D. I1. 1980); In re Jenkins, 6 BANKR. CT. DEc. (CRR) 378 (Bankr. D. Colo.
1980); In re Thorson, 6 Bankr. 678 (Bankr. D.S.D. 1980); In re Celeste, 9 Bankr.
392 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1981).
68. Marlow (1%); Jenkins ($1.00).
69. 11 U.S.C. § 1329(a), (c)(2).
70. See Celeste.
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tains a hardship discharge after trying to pay the nondischargeable
claims, the portion not paid should be discharged; this again
should encourage resort to chapter 13 by a debtor who has nondischargeable claims.
Finally, practical considerations dictate permitting the debtor
to place claims on which there are co-debtors in a separate class
from other claims. Although there may be no theoretical differences between co-debtor claims and others, there are important
practical differences. Often, the co-debtor will be a relative or
friend, and the debtor feels compelled to pay the claim. If the
debtor is going to pay the debt anyway, it is important that this
fact be considered in determining the feasibility of the plan. Sometimes, the co-debtor will have posted collateral, and the debtor will
feel obligated to make the payment to avoid repossession. In still
other cases, the co-debtor cannot make the payment, and the effect
of nonpayment will be to trigger a chapter 7 or chapter 13 petition
by the co-debtor, which may have a ripple effect on other parties
as well. For these reasons, separate classification is often practically necessary.
Courts under both the Act and the Code have emphasized that
plans must be realistic. For example, courts have refused to confirm plans which the debtor could not possibly perform, and have
insisted on realistic estimates of expenditures.7 1 This approach is
eminently sensible: no purpose is served by confirming a plan
which the particular debtor probably cannot perform. If, as a
practical matter, the debtor is going to pay the co-debtor claim, he
should be permitted to separately classify it in chapter 13. A result
which emphasizes purity in classifying claims does so at the price
of confirming a realistic plan. Neither debtors nor creditors benefit
from such a rigid approach.
CONCLUSION

Consumer bankruptcy is an urgent economic issue. This Subcommittee has made a number of recommendations which would
make the bankruptcy law consistent with the income-based approach to consumer credit, and which should stem the tide of ever
mounting bankruptcy losses.

71. See In re Guerrieri, 20 Bankr. 474 (Bankr. D.R.I. 1981); In re Landford,
10 Bankr. 129 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1981).

